

# Operations in Urban Environments

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**T**HOSE WHO FOLLOW the subject know that US post-Cold War national defense policy has the potential for application all over the world. For first-tier countries, essentially the G-7, future competition appears to be of the economic variety.<sup>1</sup> For second-tier countries, including China, India and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, the competition may be of a different sort—namely, violent turmoil across the conflict spectrum. Add the instability in the former Yugoslavia, North Korea, Nigeria, Pakistan and Mexico, exacerbated by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, criminal cartels and the related spread of corruption in government, and the “zones of turmoil” become numerous.<sup>2</sup>

On this changing “political sea,” the United States seeks a steady course. The Cold War threat of the former Soviet Union as a massive and apparently implacable military foe was a simplifying advantage for the United States.<sup>3</sup> Now, however, any attempt to base decisions for US military intervention on previously proposed various “vital interests” tests, including the Weinberger Doctrine and its derivatives, is difficult.<sup>4</sup> It is undermined in part by the difficulty in calibrating US interests around the world. The initial post-Cold War push for a new national strategy, along with a military strategy to match, appears to have abated somewhat. The present conditions might be called “policy is as policy does.”<sup>5</sup> Any statement of US policy will ultimately conclude that the United States will do whatever is necessary to defend survival and important interests. However, apart from homeland defense and protection of vital economic interests, delimiting with certainty other interests that will lead to military intervention quickly leads to speculation.

The United States will again be involved in a major conflict. Over the last five centuries, war has been present three times more frequently than it has been absent.<sup>6</sup> It may not be for a generation or more but to believe otherwise carries great risk. The com-

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plexion of future conflicts may be far different from those of the past. Technology, growing and changing almost exponentially, will see new permutations when combined with publicly accessible global communication systems.<sup>7</sup>

In this fusion of technology and potential conflict, conflicts in urban environments will assert an increasing challenge. Already, many urban environments around the world have passed a threshold of governance. One byproduct is the fuel for future fires of violence and conflict. Suggested here is a framework for analysis and understanding of urban environments and the challenges that will be part of future US intervention into those environments. A broad approach to preparation for urban intervention is discussed with emphasis on finding common ground when mixing conventional warfare with low-intensity conflict (LIC) and peacekeeping (PK) missions. Finally, an attempt to understand and manage the complexities of urban warfare is vexing. A mix of strategic insight and understanding, careful and coordinated tactical management of battlefield operating systems and highly effective operations skills within the “danger close” range of contact, are all underscored in urban environments.<sup>8</sup>

## The Status Quo

Still embedded in the militaries of most nations is a “big battalion” mentality. To be sure, unconventional

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The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the Department of the Army; the Department of Defense or any other government office or agency.—Editor

warfare and technologically advanced weaponry have been catalysts for innovation in terms other than increments of big battalions. LIC, military operations other than war (MOOTW)—with elaboration in Joint Publication 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*—and stability and support operations (SSO), form a family of

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terms found in discussions surrounding the formation of new military doctrine. In addition, within the *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)*, yet another term, “smaller-scale contingency (SSC) operations,” descriptive of localized conflicts that may require intervention by US forces, is introduced.<sup>9</sup> Yet another term is “full-spectrum dominance” found in *Joint Vision 2010*, which delineates the desired impact from the application of future US military operational concepts.<sup>10</sup> Each term could include urban intervention. However, urban intervention training strategies and techniques have struggled to remain applicable to recent and potential urban conflicts. Regardless of terminology, the World War II legacy of infantry, armor and mechanized-based armies still significantly shapes the essence of US military doctrine, as well as those of most industrialized nations.

The US doctrinal approach to urban operations—military operations on urban terrain (MOUT), used throughout this article to describe operations that are primarily *urban* in nature—has undergone several revisions in recent years in the context of a widening spectrum of conflict and the introduction of new warfighting technologies. Yet it remains one of the most vexing forms of intervention to be found on the US military force projection landscape today.

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Battlespace Battle Laboratory, at Fort Benning, Georgia, and numerous MOUT training sites throughout the United States and Europe. Close-quarters combat in confined spaces, countering urban snipers, the use of armed helicopters and other similar operations that must be conducted under conditions highly restricted by rules of engagement (ROE) are often scripted in exercise scenarios.<sup>11</sup> Increasingly, Army units are given exposure to urban environments, especially those with special circumstances including the (staged) presence of large numbers of civilians. A selective and sometimes surgical use of a wide range of US munitions is contained within this doctrine, which seeks to minimize harm to noncombatants through a balanced application of force and restraint.<sup>12</sup>

US special operations forces units have developed advanced skills in urban operations similar to those used by special weapons and tactics (SWAT) teams found in many US police departments.<sup>13</sup> A wide range of new weapons—lethal and nonlethal—is under development for use on future battlefields, with special significance for urban environments. The lessons of Somalia, Panama City, Beirut, Sarajevo and experiences from the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana, exercises have not been lost on doctrine.<sup>14</sup> However, policy makers and commanders worry that urban conflicts may contain risks that are inordinately high, especially when a prime measure of success may be minimal casualties, regardless of losses by opposing forces.<sup>15</sup> Whether through conducting more intense and integrated conventional soldier training or by creating specially trained PK forces oriented to urban conflict, the challenge remains to impose US will on its adversaries using all forms of conflict, but specifically to those fluid urban conflict environments—cities and their environs.<sup>16</sup>

## **Maintaining Superiority**

In the history of conflicts between and among nations, no side has monopolized the high ground in weapons development indefinitely. For the foreseeable future, the United States may be the exception, but “silver bullets” are rare and may become even more so as technology and its mutations become commercially attainable. Take nuclear deterrence, for instance. It costs many times more to get ahead and stay ahead than it does to play catch up. Sometimes catching up permits pulling ahead in the same act. Historic shifts in balance of power relationships reflect this dynamic.

The United States is for now virtually alone at the top in weapons development and related technology in absolute terms. Whether that technology will be

decisive in urban interventions remains to be seen. If performance criteria surrounding urban intervention include limited casualties, destruction of the adversary's will and ability to fight and restoration of stability along with the enhancement of conditions favoring democratic institutions, urban intervention with US and coalition military force may not always be capable of reaching that goal, military superiority aside.

The next war or conflict's complexion is unknowable. What is probable is that the combatants will fight with a wide range of weaponry and techniques. A conventional conflict will see a mix of tanks, aircraft, artillery and infantry. In this context, the United States will win, even if a second major or several lesser regional contingencies occur simultaneously. However, as warfare becomes less conventional, raw military power may not be as decisive, as the results of guerrilla wars, prolonged wars, wars of attrition, terrorism, insurrection and revolution have shown. In addition, "pluralistic ambiguity" of the American people may be cause for lack of support for urban interventions in other parts of the world that would otherwise be militarily feasible.<sup>17</sup>

## Cities and War

Urban areas have often been venues to test national will in the face of subversive activities, particularly insurgency.<sup>18</sup> Add the influence of international crime and corruption—"gray area" phenomena—and the importance of urban areas increases.<sup>19</sup>

Thus, cities have historically been the objective of strategic, operational and tactical military planning and campaigns. A worldwide increase in urbanism is rendering this concept no less viable today. From fortified cities dating several thousand years B.C. to modern times, cities have been an adjunct to warfare. Traditional methods for subduing cities have included seizing and assaulting with a commensurate level of violence and destruction. Methodical killing—to include annihilation—and total dismantling of cities by invaders, have been known to follow hostilities. *Bypassing* is also a military tactic with ample precedent beginning perhaps with an admonishment from Sun Tzu: "Attack cities only when there is no alternative."<sup>20</sup> Additionally, the Clausewitzian concept of "center of gravity" (COG) is useful in this analysis. In an urban area, the true COG may be a person, socio-political condition or a specific tangible object or symbol.

Present-day rocket and artillery attacks on "conventional" European towns, villages and cities in the former Yugoslavia and Chechnia may be a reminder that little has changed in urban warfare since World War II from the standpoint of attacks on urban ar-



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eas as part of a widespread or prolonged war. The unpredictable and violent experience of US forces in Mogadishu, Somalia, offers another view.<sup>21</sup>

US urban warfare and urban intervention doctrine includes adherence to laws of war as applied through ROE. The application of laws of war will be a requirement for US forces but odds are that reciprocity will be absent. Future scenarios in which urban populations are held hostage by threats of considerable harm, heightened by threats to employ WMD, may change the rules of warfare. One reason for this shift may be an increased tendency for one adversary to have much to lose in the face of an extremist or determined opponent who has little to lose by comparison and little hesitation to employ any means to an end. These *asymmetrical* threats may become more common in the future.

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## Future Conflict and Urban Warfare

In the last 15 years alone, the growth of cities throughout the world has been phenomenal. Rio de Janeiro, Bombay, Shanghai, Seoul, Mexico City, Calcutta, San Paulo, Cairo and Jakarta—all having more than 12 million people—are only a few cities where traditional governance and infrastructure seek, but often fail, to provide basic services for their inhabitants. In first-tier countries, comparatively healthy economies keep urban degenerative forces somewhat in check. As long as the national wealth of first-tier nations remains intact, large cities within those countries should not spiral into anarchy. For these urban areas, a safety net exists, made available by comparatively wealthy economies that can institute burden-sharing measures. Degrees of austerity may be necessary and civic cohesiveness may suffer; however, collapse and chaos should be avoided.

For non first-tier cities, the story is different. Aside from new births, growth in second-tier urban areas has generally resulted from an influx of the unemployed and often unemployable. Under these conditions, the demographics of growth may increasingly inhibit the ability of government to provide basic services. Potable water, sewers, streets, parks, playgrounds, hospitals, law enforcement, fire service and public cultural amenities, much less comprehensive public health programs and relatively advanced organizational concepts such as planning and zoning, have already fallen dangerously behind.<sup>22</sup> In these settings, municipal services become simply unaffordable.

As the Somalia experience demonstrated, corruption in government and an absence of social services lead to “survival of the fittest.” Tribal, ethnic, racial and economic enclaves develop that serve to segregate and alienate. Violence and lawlessness become the norm. Commerce becomes dominated by black market activities, while the legitimacy of

government, including its ability to provide an environment for a market economy, erodes. Under these conditions, hope for the inhabitants dissolves into desperation, the survival instinct borne of desperation becomes prime, and anarchy ensues.<sup>23</sup> For an urban military operation to be successful under these conditions, policy makers and commanders will be greatly challenged.

Governments exist in part to avoid, manage and remedy urban problems. Using recent events to predict the future, urban interventions may find US military commanders tasked to accomplish a wide range of missions, some involving hostilities and some not. Under these circumstances, an appreciation for the dynamics of the urban environment in which operations are to take place could prove useful, if for no other reason than as preparation for events that must follow hostilities if reconstruction and stability are goals. Indeed, the success of non-military recovery and reconstruction efforts may rest largely on events initially set in motion by military intervention.

Both combat and noncombat actions during a period of intervention may affect not only the process of initial recovery, but the sustainability of the recovery. In an ideal state, sustainability means an independence between urban areas and surrounding rural areas from which renewable sources of food and resources are provided in exchange for the goods and services obtainable from the urban environment.<sup>24</sup> The net result is a rough equilibrium in a context of balanced needs and productivity. The prevailing high levels of national debt and deficits illustrate the difficulty with application of this and other utopian-like principles. Nonetheless, sustainability does reside at one end of a global futures spectrum, with implosion of a greater part of the human race on the other. In this sense, as is true with warfare on any scale, but especially in modern urban interventions short of total war, military commanders must tailor missions, when possible, to place short- and long-term objectives in perspective. Violence and destruction may be unavoidable and often are components of urban intervention. While total war may initially, at least, lessen concern for postwar reconstruction, LIC and PK operations may call for stability and reconstruction to be the military mission. It is here that the military commander must combine the best of military skills with diplomacy, cultural awareness, civic assistance and an eye toward postintervention events.

Presuming that developing conditions in many urban areas in the world will favor strife and anarchy, the United States and its coalition partners will need new tools to manage turmoil in cities, short of



Somalis working on a barricade along Mogadishu's "Green Line" between rival clans.

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total war, while retaining the decisive power to fight and win the nation's wars. For now, the greater challenge for first-tier countries is to promote global preferences for stability and the peaceful resolution of differences. Unfortunately, the necessity to apply these techniques, through urban and other forms of conflict intervention, will increase in numbers and intensity if current global perspectives for the next century have even partial validity.<sup>25</sup> Preparation for urban intervention, by both policy makers and military commanders, will be key.

### **US National Strategy and Urban Intervention**

Today, a comprehensive statement of post-Cold War objective criteria for the global projection of US military forces in support of US interests defies articulation, especially where threats to our interests emanate from second-tier countries. The variables of context and particularity are simply too great. A National Command Authority case-by-case approach seems to be growing in acceptance. Following the Cold War, critics took the Clinton adminis-

tration to task for the ambiguity of its national strategy of *enlargement* and *engagement*. Nonetheless, that policy is the source for initial direction and decisions relative to global urban intervention. When and under what conditions will US military force be committed to hostile urban environments may become a frequent question.<sup>26</sup>

Following a decision to engage in urban warfare, the extent of engagement along with ROE, coalition arrangements, end states and postintervention activities will all be complex subsets. Ambiguity in execution is to be expected. However, a policy that seeks to embrace ambiguity should not be an ambiguous policy. Similarly, clarity of mission should not be clouded by ambiguity in execution. Especially in urban warfare, mission ambiguity is an invitation to failure. And yet, it is in the urban environment where the potential for mission ambiguity will be the greatest.<sup>27</sup> If US forces are ever to be placed in urban combat conditions, the national security interests at risk be *compelling*. Further, the military commander who is assigned the urban

combat mission must be given sufficient resources.

The following issues are just a part of, and should be a beginning for, a post-Cold War US military urban intervention equation:

- What is the nature and importance of the interest threatened? Author Sam C. Sarkesian has stated that “(I)t might be too late if Americans wait until survival is at stake.”<sup>28</sup> Will intervention provide a solution over time or is it simply the result

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of frustration and the desire to “do something”? Does it pass the “so what” test?

- What is the end state? Is one foreseeable? Should it be based on certain events, such as elections, or is it better to declare that an end state is not foreseeable?

- How long will military forces remain in place? If long term, how long? Will a stated end date for an intervention lead to a focus on solving problems before withdrawal, or will it result in a return to the status quo?

- What will the level of violence and resulting casualties be? Who will be coalition partners and does intervention consensus exist for the action taken? What is the dollar cost and who pays?

- Does the intervention have colonization ramifications or will it be perceived as such and by whom?<sup>29</sup>

- Are moral and humanitarian concerns, along with the impact of action versus inaction on US stature as a global superpower, factors that may compel intervention? Are the motivating moral and human behavior concerns sufficient to sustain the intervention over time? Will the “vital” quality of US interest leading to intervention dissipate with casualties and the passage of time?

- What are the consequences of postintervention

into urban areas? Reconstruction and other forms of assistance may be anticipated, and if so, how much, how long and how expensive? What will be the status of civilian government during intervention and thereafter? Will military intervention be a catalyst for positive economic and social development or only delay persistent conflict and turmoil?

## US Preparedness for Urban Warfare

Urban environments are increasingly contemporary warfare candidates. Among the complex challenges for the US military will be the need to carefully craft ROE.<sup>30</sup> The ability of US forces to overcome any opponent may be more limited by political guidance translated into operational and tactical ROE than military capability. This does not imply that US military forces should be employed without ROE, but rather that US military force and ROE are synonymous but can vary with missions.

A growing challenge to US urban intervention operations will be to defeat an adversary while using ROE that will, in all likelihood, be unilaterally self-applied. Potential adversaries will know this and will apply their own ROE while being quick to point out any US violations. The media will be active in these crosscurrents and may affect the nature of the conflict and its outcome.

As in the past, the United States may face belligerents who operate on an urban conflict spectrum that includes: ethnic cleansing; hostage taking; mass killings; sabotage; terrorist acts; indiscriminate use of booby traps and mines; willful destruction of buildings and infrastructure; suicide assaults; and efforts to obtain favorable media attention.

US military forces will not use these tactics, but will use those below both proactively and responsively as appropriate:<sup>31</sup>

- Building and area search and clearance, including cordon and search.

- Minimizing collateral damage through selective destruction of buildings and infrastructure, including “surgical” air strikes, artillery and missile use, and other focused ground operations.

- Selective incarceration.

- Disabling or assuming control of infrastructure and communications facilities.

- Civil affairs (CA) and psychological operations (PSYOP).

- Cooperation with nongovernment organizations where possible.

- Martial law, police operations and crowd control.

- Roadblocks and checkpoints.

- Show of force/patrolling.

- Civil and military tribunals.

- Employment of a wide range of sensors, non-



A clan representative hands out work passes to Solalis granted permission to work in Sword Base.

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lethal but debilitating weaponry and other emerging technologies.

Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell stated that only overwhelming force should be used by the US military when in combat. US military doctrine seeks to adhere to this principle. Urban operations will of necessity be more selective in matching the means to the mission, often in conformity with ROE. A 15-to-1 invader to defender ratio, as suggested for traditional urban occupation operations, may not be possible.<sup>32</sup> Tactics may lie less with the numbers of troops and more with an understanding of the battle area, politically and socially, as well as physically and demographically. Presuming that intervention is undertaken, the selection of types of force and forces, as well as tactics, will be keys to success. The use of special or conventional forces and the permissible contexts and conditions for confrontation with belligerents are baseline issues in mission planning.

US forces are capable of conducting urban intervention under a wide band of mission conditions and objectives. However, as ROE restrict violent means, the difficulty of mission completion may increase proportionately. Risk assessments at all levels of

the decision process are particularly important under these conditions. A risk assessment may introduce political, social, racial, ethical and economic factors that will have direct bearing on the effectiveness of combat operations. These conditions and others may indicate a need to examine mission alternatives in both the strategic and operational domains.

Urban warfare is examined in US military doctrine and related writings under the heading of MOUT. Both the Army and Marine Corps have field manuals on the subject.<sup>33</sup> In preparation for operations in Bosnia, and possibly as a pretext for all Army urban intervention, training has been made to be as situationally specific as possible. One US Army brigade commander has moved beyond traditional MOUT training in an effort to prepare for the complexities of deployment into urban conditions as might be encountered by US forces there. He sought to confront the potential for "national policy to be practiced at the squad level." His training included an endless series of "what if" real-life training scenarios in which the precision of written ROE were often found to collide with the violent realities of human behavior in warfare. The training



emphasized the use of snipers in what might be called a form of bounding overwatch.<sup>34</sup> The result is intended to be effective especially in opposing ambush, hit-and-run, guerrilla and other tactics ex-

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acerbated by factional and tribal extremism, fundamentalism and irrational behavior as part of the mix. Complementing these techniques is the admonishment to avoid a garrison mentality: live and constantly operate among those who are being helped; force the enemy to move away from the urban setting to locations where modern maneuver warfare can be applied; and place increased emphasis on individual soldier marksmanship and snipers.<sup>35</sup>

The FM 90-1 series of Army publications thoroughly examines aspects of fighting using a central European model (not, perhaps, unlike Bosnia today). Urban intervention and PK training are expanding to include missions with the population still *intact*. New manuals are beginning to reshape this aspect of Army doctrine. Commanders and leaders are learning the intervals between methodical exercises in locations occupied solely by adversaries and exercises where buildings are occupied and streets are full of inhabitants of both sexes and all ages.<sup>36</sup>

Mines and booby traps may be encountered in urban operations. Preparation for these challenges will be essential, as will be control of soldiers who witness friendly casualties and whose frustration and anger will be high. Emotions will also be high when the setting for potential or actual violent confrontation includes children, the elderly, families and the general population's presence. Response to terrorist and suicide attacks is especially difficult under these circumstances. As always, but especially in urban interventions, area of operations intelligence will be of great importance, and CA and PSYOP units will be central participants.

To meet these challenges, the Army has increased the number of urban training sites in recent years. In addition, one writer has called for a national urban training center and specially trained US PK brigades. This idea has met opposition on the grounds that Army units separately trained for PK are not necessary.<sup>37</sup> Ostensibly, members of these forces would be specially screened and trained to combine and apply civil-military tasks at the tactical level. Maintenance of law and order with nation assistance would be primary tasks. Members would also have skills in nonviolent dispute resolution and, in general, take an ideological stance placing less emphasis on confrontation.

Whether a reconfigured military slice is the manifestation of this force or whether an entirely new entity will be created remains to be seen. At present, the military is the only instrument of US foreign policy that has the force-projection capability and variety of inherent skills required for these missions. Many law enforcement and security agencies are skilled in specific aspects of urban warfare, but none has the capability or potential scope of mission for large-scale operations as does the military. The military is likely to continue in that role and, unless a newly configured force is devised, will use conventionally trained forces with enhanced skills as required to face the sometimes contradictions of peacekeeping and warfighting, including operations in cities.<sup>38</sup>

Today insurgency movements are found in both urban and rural environments. Hezbollah and Hamas, as well as Mexican insurgents in Chiapas, are but a few of many. Police forces are generally recognized as the first and preferred line of defense in countering urban guerrilla activities. Army units are better suited for the same mission in rural areas. The effectiveness of civilian police is often in direct proportion to both the government's perceived legitimacy and police ability to work effectively with other agencies of government, including the military and intelligence-gathering functions. Historically, in the case of emerging and threatened governments, threats to urban stability by terrorists or guerrilla forces are countered by military force. The results can be counterproductive in that the tactics used by the military may be excessive and disproportionate and further erode public support for their government.

## **The New Urban Intervention Doctrine**

As training scenarios for urban settings are developed, it will be important to recall that cities are not monoliths but rather are complex collections of physical, geographical, social and economic conditions, each having different dynamics, characteristics and requirements relative to military-urban in-



tervention, be it PK or warfare.<sup>39</sup> While cities are increasingly becoming home to the masses, so also are cultural, racial and economic differences becoming more polarized. Large cities are a collection of many smaller cities, districts and neighborhoods. Training for urban intervention does employ a set of common tasks. However, so great and significant are the specific differences among areas of potential intervention by US forces that no single training template will suffice. To the common tasks must be added the specific tasks related to culture, ethnicity, population, terrorists, hostile and friendly relationships and societal norms, among others.

Of no small importance will be the decision to engage in urban operations. While this aspect of urban operations is addressed in present Army doctrine, future force projection in the context of PK or urban intervention may, by necessity, begin and end in urban settings, eliminating an avoidance option.

The contemporary American approach to war constantly seeks to find technical means to minimize casualties and the destruction of equipment and materials. In recent years, a much-discussed revolution in military affairs (RMA) has worked its way into US military thinking about the conduct of warfare. For the Army, Force XXI is the embodiment of the new technical era. Using an elaborate system of sensors and complex computer-based communication systems, RMA and Force XXI seek to create a digital awareness of battlespace features and dynamics that virtually eliminates any potential for surprise by an enemy force. The outcome is to cause maneuver warfare to be essentially one-sided and overwhelmingly favorable to US forces. For traditional "big battalion" encounters, these developments are well suited. Urban intervention and PK will benefit from these developments as well, but "transparency," which is the goal for the maneuver battlefield, may be less effective in densely populated, disorderly and disrupted urban settings. Modern cities in first-tier countries have their share of poverty and decay. Few, however, have the extensive "urban encampments of the poor" that are characteristic of many second-tier and Third World countries. Urban intervention under these latter conditions can be a nightmare.

It is here that strategic, operational and tactical objectives must be given closest scrutiny. An "asymmetry" of objectives may exist that neither superior technology, overwhelming firepower nor raw soldier courage can overcome. Under these and similar conditions, policy must provide answers to the questions, "What is the end state and what are the ROE?" In addition, a commander must have the maximum discretion possible to shape the mis-

sion based on answers to the following:

- Is containment better than intervention, which may be a policy question on the strategic level?
- Is the combat power available suitable for the ROE?
- Who is the enemy? Aside from the ROE, are basic US values in conflict with aspects of the mission? Will soldiers hesitate to execute the mission—

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for instance, if children, bystanders, elderly and women are involved?

- Do soldiers have situational understanding? Is the physical layout of the area of potential conflict known? Are the tools and ROE flexible enough to counter hit-and-run, guerrilla or terrorist tactics?
- Can police functions be performed, where and when necessary? Is the military force capable of crowd control, arrest and detention, speaking the native language, creating and managing roadblocks and the like?
- Is the use of deadly force clearly understood? Are snipers integrated into the tactical scheme of maneuver?
- In the areas of PSYOP, intelligence gathering and CA, what is to be expected as the intervention unfolds, and what types of weapons are to be encountered? What is the nature of the adversary? Is he trained in guerrilla tactics or untrained but dangerously armed? What is his level of commitment/motivation?

Urban warfare is hardly on anyone's preferred list of ways and means to resolve conflicts. However, the irreversible increase in urbanism worldwide leaves little choice for military planners but to hope for the best and prepare for the worst. The worst may be, for the most part, avoidable. However, missions may arise where intervention into urban conditions under the most challenging circumstances is required.

If US soldiers are to accomplish urban intervention missions, they must be trained and equipped with new skills and technologies. Missions must minimize ambiguity and exposure to risk, and be

achievable. Soldiers must be confident of themselves, believe in their purpose and be prepared for long periods of stressful and tense experiences short of violent confrontation as well as traditional com-

bat. Careful consideration of these issues may assist in providing US soldiers and commanders a foundation for success in future urban warfighting and PK missions. **MR**

## NOTES

1. G-7 countries include: Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the United States.
2. Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, *The Real World Order: Zones of Peace, Zone of Turmoil* (Chatnam House Publishers, 1993).
3. Barry M. Blechman, et al., *The American Military in the 21st Century* (New York: The St. Martin's Press in association with the Henry L. Stimson Center, 1993), xvii.
4. Donald E. Nuechterlein, *America Recommitted: United States National Interests in a Reconstructed World* (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1989), 22-29. See also Robert D. Blackwill, "Taxonomy for Defining U.S. National Security Interests in the 1990s and Beyond," *Europe and Global Change: Strategies and Options for Europe*, edited by Werner Weidenfeld and Josef Janning (Guetersloh, Dertelsmann Foundation Publishers, 1993).
5. Implied is the challenge contained in devising a national interest test that would make known in advance the criteria for commitment of US military forces into potentially hostile or combat-probable conditions. For example, it now seems clear that national interests include humanitarian interests and egregious acts or crimes against humanity. It may now be more accurate to say that any national interests test is three-quarters objective and one-quarter situationally specific and subjective. Possibly it has always been this way, but the Cold War climate allowed for neater objectivity inasmuch as multiple and frequent deployments on the margin of hostilities were far less frequent.
6. John J. Weltman, *World Politics and the Evolution of War* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 1.
7. *Close Support End-To-End Assessment (CSEEA)*, MOUT [Military Operations on Urban Terrain] War Game, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia (seminar and war game conducted 24 to 28 February 1997, Defense Logistics Agency), classified FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. This ambitious exercise sought to analyze the resources, tasks and timelines associated with a large-scale urban warfare maneuver and clearing operation in a sector of a hypothetical large city much like Seoul, Korea. The enormity of the hypothetical operation emphasized the need for technology to provide options for what might otherwise be an overwhelming task. See also James A. Lasswell, "Wall To Wall, Sea Dragon's Next Phase Explores Urban Warfighting Tactics For The 21st Century," *Armed Forces Journal International*, January 1998, 36-39. This article updates Marine Corps initiatives relative to urban warfare in the context of the two-year-old Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory.
8. Robert E. Everson, *Standing at the Gates of the City: Operational Level Actions and Urban Warfare*, School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), US Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC), Fort Leavenworth, KS, Academic Year (AY) 1994-95, 6-10, but the entire study is recommended.
9. Ricardo J. Rinaldo, "Warfighting and Peace Ops: Do Real Soldiers Do MOOTW," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Winter 1996-97, 111-116. Proponents of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) differ with traditionalists as to the degree of doctrinal extension beyond "fighting and winning the nation's wars" needed to accommodate the range of approaches necessary to resolve conflicts. At issue is whether principles of war and principles of MOOTW differ. Of particular interest is a comparison of the principles of war: objective, offensive, simplicity, mass, maneuver, surprise, security, unity of command and economy of force, with principles of MOOTW: objective, unity of effort, legitimacy, perseverance, restraint and security. Despite the distinctions in the comparison, the author argues that "fighting and winning America's wars" subsumes MOOTW. See also Sean D. Naylor, "Army takes to the urban streets," *Army Times*, 21 July 1997, 22; and Larry Lane, "Role Playing for Bosnia," *Soldiers*, March 1998, 20-21.
10. US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-5, *Force XXI Operations: A Concept for the Evolution of Full-Dimensional Operations for the Strategic Army of the Early Twenty-First Century* (Fort Monroe: TRADOC, 1994), 2-5.
11. US Army Field Manual (FM) 90-10-1, *An Infantryman's Guide to Combat in Built-Up Areas*, Change 1, 3 OCT 1995.
12. Charles A. Preysler, *Going Down Town: The Need for Precision Mount* (SAMS, USACGSC, Fort Leavenworth, First Term, AY 94-95), 22.
13. David H. Bailey, "A Foreign Policy for Democratic Policing," *Policing and Society*, vol. 5, no. 1: 79-93.
14. Beirut is a special story in that it became urban intervention run amok. Israeli forces unleashed Christian Phalangist forces in Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut in what was to be a "cleanup" operation but resulted instead in a massacre of civilians. The investigation that followed found a lack of control and oversight by Israeli forces that allowed relatively controlled warfare to become indiscriminate killing.
15. In Mogadishu, US light forces inflicted a 15:1 casualty ratio. However, this was not the measure of success.
16. University of Kentucky Patterson School of International Diplomacy, Fall 1995, Symposium on Low-Intensity Conflict, paper by Don Snyder on Peacekeeping Forces. See also Blechman, 77.
17. Weltman, 220. See also *The Disuniting of America*, Arthur Schlesinger, and the Israeli view of when a country can go to war without acknowledged public support.
18. Jennifer Morrison Taw and Bruce Hoffinan, *The Urbanization of Insurgency: The Potential Challenge to U.S. Operations* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1994), 11-15.
19. Max G. Manwaring, ed., *Gray Area Phenomena: Confronting the New World Disorder* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), xiii.
20. Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, Samuel B. Griffith trans. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 78.
21. Kent DeLong and Steven Tuckey, *Mogadishu: Heroism and Tragedy* (Westport, CT: Praeger Press, 1994), Foreword.
22. Alan Riding, *Distant Neighbors: A Portrait of the Mexicans* (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), Chapter 13, "Mexico City: Magnet and Monster."
23. Earl H. Fry, Stan A. Taylor and Robert S. Wood, *America the Vincible: U.S. Foreign Policy for the Twenty-First Century* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1994), 110 and 270.
24. Lester R. Brown, et al., *State of the World 1994: A World Watch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society* (New York: Norton, 1994).
25. These readings form a provocative and often contrasting, but rich collection of essentially post-Cold War observations and prognostications related to the source and causes of conflict in the world. Clearly, many other works are worthy candidates, but those shown are selected to illustrate the boundaries of the discussion as well as themes: Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993, 22-49; Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, *The Real World Order: Zones of Peace, Zone of Turmoil* (Chatnam House Publishers, 1993); Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," *The Atlantic Monthly*, February, 1994; Alvin and Hedi Toffler, *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1993); Paul Kennedy, *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century* (Vintage Books, 1994); Alexander L. George, *Bridging the Gap* (United States Institute of Peace, 1993); and Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History* (Avon Books, 1993).
26. Despite attempts to formalize and formalize a decision-making process, a decision to commit US forces to war or lesser but potentially violent conflict, will be situationally specific. A convincing threat to a national security interest will be required, but the complexity and degree of threat that will trigger a US military response cannot be known in advance. See Blackwill, endnote 4, and Edwin J. Arnold, Jr., "The Use of Military Power in Pursuit of National Interests," *Parameters*, Spring 1994, 4-12. Particularly interesting in this discussion is the question of, "Under what circumstances can a (democratic) nation go to war in the absence of domestic consensus?" For a thoughtful discussion see Shai Feldman and Heda Reznitz-Kinger, *Deception, Consensus and War: Israel in Lebanon*, The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (JCSS), Tel Aviv University, Paper No. 2, October 1988, 73.
27. Russell W. Glenn, *Combat in Hell, A Consideration of Constrained Urban Warfare*, Arroyo Center National Defense Research Institute, RAND Corporation, 1996, 9.
28. Sam C. Sarkesian, *U.S. National Security: Policymakers, Processes, and Politics* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Press, 1995), 25.
29. One reason given for the cessation of Operation Desert Storm was to prevent an open-ended occupation of Baghdad. In essence a massive urban intervention was bypassed, not by maneuver forces in a continuing conflict, but rather in the transition from military solution to political solution.
30. An excellent and concise overview of rules of engagement can be found in *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations* (Joint Warfighting Center, Fort Monroe, VA, 16 June 1997), 1-13 to 1-120. The sources for guidance on formulating ROE are many, but approaching the task from a peace operations context seems particularly relevant and useful, given the probable nature of the majority of future military missions.
31. Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Fort Leavenworth, KS. CALL offers a variety of timely and useful publications related to military operations on urban terrain (MOUT), operations other than war (OOTW), peace operations and specific US military operations. The value in these materials lies in the ability to draw from them the specific lessons that will be important to future operations and the variables that will apply. Indeed, a future CALL mission may be to "package" applicable lessons learned for future urban operations, with emphasis on the most effective means for enforcing applicable ROE.
32. T.R. Milton, "Urban Operations: Future War," *Military Review*, February 1994, 41.
33. FM 90-10, *Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain* (1979); US Army Training Circular (TC) 90-1, *Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain Training* (1986); and 90-10-1, *An Infantryman's Guide to Combat in Built-Up Areas* (1993), (Washington, DC: Department of the Army). US Marine Corps Operational Handbook No. 8-7, *Military Operations in Urbanized Terrain* (1980).
34. Thomas E. Ricks, "Battle Plans: In Wake of Cold War, An Intellectual Leads Army in New Missions-Key Weapon: A Sniper's Rifle," *Wall Street Journal*, Vol. LXXVI, No. 245, September 1995, 1.
35. Milton, 41.
36. *Parameters*, Spring 1996 letter to the editor.
37. Ralph Peters, *Our Soldiers, Their Cities*. See also Don Snyder, "U.S. Civil-Military Relations and Operations Other Than War," *Civil-Military Relations and the Not-Quite Wars of the Present and Future* (Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Vincent Davis, Editor, 1996).
38. Blechman, 415.
39. Richard M. Francey Jr., *The Urban Anatomy: Fundamentals of a City* (SAMS, USACGSC, Second Term AY 94-95), 38-41.

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